Abstract-Website fingerprinting enables an attacker to infer the source of a web page when a client is browsing through encrypted or anonymized network connections. We present a new website fingerprinting attack based on fingerprints extracted from random decision forests and evaluate performance on three separate data sets consisting of both standard web pages as well as Tor hidden services. Within the context of this attack we provide an analysis of the utility of previously proposed traffic features. Our attack, k-fingerprinting, performs better than current state-of-the-art attacks even against website fingerprinting defenses. We show that it is possible to launch a website fingerprinting attack in the face a large amount of noisy data. We further show that error rates vary widely between web resources, and thus some patterns of use will be predictably more vulnerable to attack than others.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional encryption obscures only the content of communications and does not hide metadata such as the time, size and direction of traffic. Anonymous communication systems obscure both content and metadata, preventing a passive attacker from being able to infer the source or destination of communication.
Anonymous communications tools, such as Tor [8] , route traffic through relays to hide its ultimate destination. Tor is designed to be a low-latency system to support interactive activities such as instant messaging and web browsing, and does not significantly alter the shape of network traffic. This allows an attacker to exploit information leaked via the order, timing and volume of resources requested from a website. As a result, many works have shown that website fingerprinting attacks are possible even when a client is doing encrypted browsing or using an anonymity tool such as Tor [26] , [16] , [12] , [18] , [23] , [5] , [35] , [14] , [34] , [32] .
Website fingerprinting is commonly formulated as a classification problem. An attacker wishes to know whether a client browses one of n web pages. The attacker first collects many examples of traffic traces from each of the n web pages by performing web-requests through the protection mechanism under attack; features are extracted and a machine learning algorithm is trained to classify the website using those features. When a client browses a web page, the attacker passively collects the traffic, passes it in to their classifier and checks if the client visited one of the n web pages. In the literature this is referred to as the closed-world scenario -a client is restricted to browse a limited number of web pages, monitored by the attacker. However, the closed-world model has been criticised for being unrealistic [14] , [24] since a client is unlikely to only browse a limited set of web pages. The open-world scenario attempts to model a more realistic set-up where the attacker monitors a small number of web pages, but allows a client to additionally browse to a large world size of unmonitored web pages.
Despite some preliminary work by Panchenko et al. [23] , there is a notable absence of feature analysis in the website fingerprinting literature. Instead features are picked based on heuristic arguments. Once features and a classifier have been chosen the pipeline is simple: an attacker trains on a corpus of previously collected traffic instances, and waits to collect test traces from which they infer what web page a client is browsing. Techniques such as Naive-Bayes [12] , k-Nearest Neighbour [34] , decision tree [14] , SVM [23] and N-grams [9] have all been used to perform website fingerprinting attacks.
Our attack uses random decision forests [3] , an ensemble method using multiple decision trees. We use random forests because they have been shown to perform well in classification tasks [11] , [27] , [15] and allow for analysis of feature importance [10] . Furthermore, they allow us to extract fingerprints to perform identification in an open-world.
The key contributions of this work are as follows:
• In section III-C we present a new attack, k-fingerprinting, based on extracting a fingerprint for a web page via random forests. We show k-fingerprinting is more accurate and faster than other state-of-the-art website fingerprinting attacks [34] , [5] .
• In section V we perform analysis of the features used in this and prior work to determine which yield the most information about an encrypted or anonymized web page. We show that simple features such as counting the number of packets in a sequence leaks more information about the identity of a web page than complex features such as packet ordering or packet inter-arrival time features.
• We consider a larger open-world setting than has been considered in prior works.
Previously the largest openworld study considered 5,000 unmonitored web pages
Permission to freely reproduce all or part of this paper for noncommercial purposes is granted provided that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Reproduction for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited without the prior written consent of the Internet Society, the first-named author (for reproduction of an entire paper only), and the author's employer if the paper was prepared within the scope of employment. [34] . In section VII we experiment with an open-world size of 100,000 collected via Tor while in VIII and VIII-C we experiment with open-world sizes of 7,000 and 17,000 collected via a standard web browser, reflecting a more realistic website fingerprinting attack over multiple browsing sessions. Section VII contains an open-world size that is an order of magnitude larger than the current largest open-world website fingerprinting work [34] 1 .
• In section VII we show that an attacker need only train on a small fraction of the total data to achieve a low false positive rate, greatly reducing the start-up cost an attacker would need to perform the attack.
• In section IX we observe that the error rate is uneven and so it may be advantageous to throw away some training information that could confuse a classifier. An attacker can learn the error rate of their attack from the training set, and use this information to select which web pages they wish to monitor in order to minimize their error rates.
• In section X we evaluate k-fingerprinting against many popular website fingerprinting defenses and show it outperforms the state-of-the-art attack k-NN [34] .
• In section XI we show training k-fingerprinting is an order of magnitude faster than the state-of-the-art attack k-NN [34] .
• We confirm that browsing over Tor does not provide any additional protection against fingerprinting attacks over browsing using a standard web browser. Furthermore we show that k-fingerprinting is highly accurate on Tor hidden services as well as standard web pages, and that Tor hidden services can be distinguished from standard web pages.
II. RELATED WORK
Website fingerprinting has been studied extensively. Early work by Wagner and Schneier [30] , Cheng and Avnur [7] exposed the possibility that encrypted HTTP GET requests may leak information about the URL, conducting preliminary experiments on a small number of websites. They asked clients in a lab setting to browse a website for 5-10 minutes, pausing two seconds between page loading. With caching disabled they were able to correctly identify 88 pages out of 92 using simple packet features. Early website fingerprinting defenses were usually designed to safeguard against highly specific attacks. In 2009, Wright et al. [36] designed 'traffic morphing' that allowed a client to shape their traffic to look as if it was generated from a different website. They were able to show that this defense does well at defeating early website 1 [14] considers an open world size of ∼35K but only tried to separate monitored pages from unmonitored pages instead of further classifying the monitored pages to the correct website. The authors assume the adversary monitors four pages: google.com, facebook.com, wikipedia.org and twitter.com. They trained a classifier using 36 traces for each of the Alexa Top 100 web pages, including the web pages of the monitored pages. The four traces for each of the monitored sites plus one trace for each of the unmonitored sites up to ∼35K are used for testing.
fingerprinting attacks that heavily relied on exploiting unique packet length features [26] , [16] .
In a similar fashion, Tor pads all packets to a fixed-size cells of 512 bytes. Tor also implemented randomized ordering of HTTP pipelines [25] in response to the attack by Panchenko et al. [23] who used packet ordering features to train an SVM classifier. This attack on Tor achieved an accuracy of 55%, compared to a previous attack that did not use such fine grained features achieving 3% accuracy on the same data set using a Naive-Bayes classifier [12] . Other defenses such as the decoy defense [23] loads a camouflage website in parallel to a legitimate website, adding a layer of background noise. They were able to show using this defense attack accuracy of the SVM again dropped down to 3% despite using intelligent features such as packet orderings.
Luo et al. [19] designed the HTTPOS fingerprinting defense at the application layer. HTTPOS acts as a proxy accepting HTTP requests and obfuscating them before allowing them to be sent. It modifies network features on the TCP and HTTP layer such as packet size, packet time and payload size, along with using HTTP pipelining to obfuscate the number of outgoing packets. They showed that HTTPOS was successful in defending against a number of classifiers [2] , [6] , [16] and [26] .
More recently Dyer et al. [9] created a defense, BuFLO, that combines many previous countermeasures, such as fixed packet sizes and constant rate traffic. Dyer et al. showed this defense improved upon other defenses at the expense of a high bandwidth overhead. Cai et al. [4] made modifications to the BuFLO defense based on rate adaptation again at the expense of a high bandwidth overhead. Following this Nithyanand et al. [21] proposed Glove, that groups website traffic into clusters that cannot be distinguished from any other website in the set. This provides information theoretic privacy guarantees and reduces the bandwidth overhead by intelligently grouping web traffic in to similar sets.
Cai et al. [5] modified the kernel in Panchenko et al.'s SVM to improve an attack on Tor, and was further improved in an open-world setting by Wang and Goldberg in 2013 [35] , achieving a True Positive rate of over 0.95 and a False Positive rate of 0.002 when monitoring one web page. Wang et al. [34] conducted attacks on Tor using large open-world sets. Using a k-nearest neighbour classifier they achieved a True Positive rate of 0.85 and False Positive rate of 0.006 when monitoring 100 web pages out of 5100 web pages. More recently Wang and Goldberg [33] suggested a defense using a browser in half-duplex mode -meaning a client cannot send multiple requests to servers in parallel. In addition to this simple modification they add random padding and show they can even foil an attacker with perfect classification accuracy with a comparatively (to other defenses) small bandwidth overhead. Finally Wang and Goldberg [32] took website fingerprinting attacks out of the lab. By maintaining an upto-date training set and splitting a full packet sequence in to components comprising of different web page load traces they show that practical website fingerprinting attacks are possible.
By considering a time gap of 1.5 seconds between web page loads, their splitting algorithm can successfully parse a single packet sequence in to multiple packet sequences with no loss in website fingerprinting accuracy.
Website fingerprinting defenses attempt to make all packet sequences look as similar as possible to foil classifiers, at the expense of bandwidth and latency. Website fingerprinting defenses can be separated into two categories, simulatable and non-simulatable [34] . Simulatable defenses operate on an input packet sequence and output another packet sequence, based upon packet features such as direction, size and time. Their advantage is that they do not have to be applied from applications that have access to sensitive client data, such as an extension in the browser. They do not require any more information than would be available to an attacker. Examples of simulatable defenses include BuFLO [9] , CS-BuFLO [4] , background noise [23] , Tor packet padding, traffic morphing [36] . Non-simulatable defenses applied at the application layer include HTTPOS [19] and Tor's randomization of packet orderings. Both types of defense come at the expense of bandwidth or time overhead and may not be tolerable to the average client wishing to browse online with little latency. For example BuFLO pads all packets to a fixed size, leading to a bandwidth overhead of 190%.
III. ATTACK DESIGN
We consider an attacker that can passively collect a client's encrypted or anonymized web traffic, and aims to infer which web resource is being requested. Dealing with an open-world, makes approaches based purely on classifying previously seen websites inapplicable. Therefore k-fingerprinting aims to define a distance-based classifier, similar to the k-NN [34] approach. It manages unbalanced sized classes and assigns meaningful distances between packet sequences, where closeby 'fingerprints' denote requests likely to be for the same resources.
A. Threat model
We make the following usage assumptions following Juarez et al. [14] : The client browses to one web page at a time, and does not perform multi-tab browsing. The attacker is able to perfectly infer the start and end of the page load (for our data sets we chose a cut off point of 20 seconds after which an attacker would stop recording traffic). The client browses the web but does not perform any other actions that create network traffic such as downloading via BitTorrent or using VoIP.
The only information that the attacker may extract from the observed web-browsing activity is the timing and volume of incoming and outgoing traffic, as transformed by the protection mechanism chosen. For example, an attacker observing Tor will be observing padded cells, while an attacker observing web-browsing under traffic morphing [36] may be observing payloads that are padded so that they conform to a specified target set of web pages.
The attacker is able to use the protection mechanism under study to retrieve a number of pages under observation, as well as a number of other random pages, to use as training data. Furthermore, the network conditions under which these training traces are requested are indistinguishable from, or can be made arbitrarily similar to, the network conditions under which target clients will be performing requests.
B. Extracting k-fingerprints from random forests
Random forests are a classification technique consisting of an ensemble of decision trees, taking a consensus vote of how to classify a new object. They have been shown to perform well in classification, regression [15] , [3] and anomaly detection [17] . Each tree in the forest is trained using labeled objects represented as feature vectors of a fixed size. Training includes some randomness to prevent over-fitting: the training set for each tree is sampled from the available training set with replacement. Due to the bootstrap sampling process there is no need for k-fold cross validation to measure k-fingerprinting performance, it is estimated via the unused training samples on each tree [3] . This is referred to as the out-of-bag score.
In this work we use random forests to extract a fingerprint for each traffic instance, instead of using directly the classification output of the forest. We define a distance metric between two traces based on the output of the forest: given a feature vector each tree in the forest associates a leaf identifier with it, forming a vector of leaf identifiers for the item, which we refer to as the fingerprint.
Once fingerprint vectors are extracted for two traces, we use the Hamming 2 distance to calculate the distance between these fingerprints 3 
.
We classify a test instance as the label of the closest k training instances via the Hamming distance of fingerprints -assuming all labels agree. We evaluate the effect of varying k, the number of fingerprints used for comparison, in sections VI and VIII.
This leafs vector output from a trained random forest classifier represents a robust fingerprint: we expect similar traffic sequences are more likely to fall on the same leaves than dissimilar traffic sequences. This is the case since the forest has been trained on a classification task, thus selecting decision branches that keep traces from the same websites in the same leafs, and those from different ones apart.
We can vary the number of training instances k a fingerprint should match, to allow an attacker to trade the True Positives for False Positives. This is not possible using directly the classification of the random forest. By using a k closest fingerprint technique for classification, the attacker can choose how they wish to decide upon final classification 4 . For the closed-world scenario we do not need the additional fingerprint layer for classification, we can simply use the classification output of the random forest since all classes are balanced and our attack does not have to differentiate between False Positives and False Negatives. For the closed-world scenario we measure the mean accuracy of the random forest on the given test data and labels.
C. The k-fingerprinting attack
The k-fingerprinting attack proceeds as follows: The attacker chooses which web pages they wish to monitor and captures network traffic generated via loading the monitored web pages and some unmonitored web pages. These target traces for monitored websites, along with many traces for unmonitored websites, are used to train a random forest for classification. Given a packet sequence representing each training instance of a monitored web page, it is converted to a fixed length fingerprint as described in Section III-B and stored.
The attacker now passively collects instances of web page loads from a client's browsing session. A fingerprint is extracted from the newly collected packet sequence, as described in section III-B. The attacker then computes the Hamming distance of this new fingerprint against the corpus of fingerprints collected during training. In the open-world scenario we follow the Wang et al. [34] method for final classification. For each test instance with a given leaf vector fingerprint, we select the k training instances with minimum Hamming distances to this leaf vector. A test instance is classified as a monitored page if and only if all k fingerprints agree on classification, otherwise the test instance is classified as an unmonitored page.
We define performance measures for the attack as follows:
• True Positive Rate. The probability that a monitored page is classified as the correct monitored page.
• True Negative Rate. The probability that an unmonitored page is correctly classified as an unmonitored page.
• False Positive Rate. The probability that an unmonitored page is incorrectly classified as a monitored page.
• False Negative Rate. The probability that a monitored page is incorrectly classified as a different monitored page or an unmonitored page.
IV. DATA GATHERING
We chose to collect two data sets, one collected via Tor, DS T or , and one collected via a standard web broswer, DS N orm . DS N orm consists of 30 instances from each of 55 monitored web pages, along with 17,000 unmonitored web pages chosen from Alexas top 20,000 web sites [1] . We collected DS N orm using a number of Amazon EC2 instances . We used tcpdump Monitored pages were collected in batches of 30 and unmonitored web pages were collected successively. Page loading was performed with no caches and time gaps between multiple loads of the same web page, as recommended by Wang and Goldberg [35] . We chose to monitor web pages from Alexa's top 100 web sites [1] to provide a comparison with the real world censored web pages used in the Wang et al. [34] data set. DS T or was collected in a similar manner to DS N orm but was collected via the Tor browser. DS T or consists of two subsets of monitored web pages: (i) 100 instances from each of the 55 top Alexa monitored web pages and (ii) 80 instances from each of 30 popular Tor hidden services 9 . The unmonitored set is comprised of the top 100,000 Alexa web pages, excluding the top 55.
For comparison to previous work, we also use the Wang et al. data set [34] , which collected 90 instances from each of 100 monitored sites, along with 5000 unmonitored web pages. The Wang et al. monitored web pages are various realworld censored websites from UK, Saudi Arabia and China providing a realistic set of web pages an attacker 10 may wish to monitor. The unmonitored web pages are chosen at random from Alexa's top 10,000 websites -with no intersection between monitored and unmonitored web pages.
This allows us to validate k-fingerprinting on two different data sets while allowing for direct comparison against the state-of-the-art k-Nearest Neighbour attack [34] . We can also infer how well the attack works on censored web pages which may not have small landing pages or be set up for caching like websites in the top Alexa list. Testing k-fingerprinting on both real-world censored websites and top alexa websites indicates how the attack performs across a wide range of websites.
We vary the number of stored fingerprints k between 1 and 10 and vary the number of unmonitored pages we train on: for the attack on 7000 unmonitored web pages we train between 1 and 6500 unmonitored pages, for the attack on 17,000 unmonitored web pages we train between 1000 and 15,000 unmonitored pages, for the attack on 100,000 unmonitored web pages we train between 2000 and 16,000 unmonitored pages and for the Wang et al. [34] data set we train between 1 and 4500 unmonitored pages. The variations in unmonitored training instances simulates different scenarios under which an attacker can train on different world sizes. We show that an attacker need only train on a small fraction of the unmonitored web pages to achieve a low false positive rate.
For the sake of comparison, according to a study by research firm Nielsen [28] the number of unique websites visited per month by an average client in 2010 was 89. Another study [22] , [14] collected web site statistics from 80 volunteers in a virtual office environment. Traffic was collected from each volunteer for a total of 40 hours. The mean unique number of websites visited per volunteer was 484, this is substantially 9 A Tor hidden service is a website that is hosted on a Tor relay and so both server and client remain anonymous to one another and any external observers. We chose hidden services to fingerprint based on popularity as listed by the .onion search engine http://www.ahmia.fi/ 10 For example an ISP or nation state. smaller than the world sizes we consider in our experiments. However, we note that the data was collected in a lab setting that may not realistically reflect a clients browsing habits.
V. FEATURE SELECTION
Our first contribution is a systematic analysis of feature selection. All experiments in this section were performed with the Wang et al. data set [34] so as to allow direct comparison with their attack results.
We train a random forest classifier in the closed-world setting using a feature vector comprised of features in the literature, and labels corresponding to the monitored sites. We use the gini coefficient as the purity criterion for splitting branches and estimate feature importance using the standard methodology described by Breiman [13] , [3] , [10] . Each time a decision tree branches on a feature the weighted sum of the gini impurity index for the two descendent nodes is higher than the purity of the parent node. We add up the gini decrease for each individual feature over the entire forest to get a consistent measure of feature importance.
We explain each feature used and following this perform feature analysis. Some of the features in the feature set have different lengths due to the different lengths of packet sequences, in this case we pad these features with 0's, and extract a feature vector of length 150 from every packet sequence. Figure 1 illustrates the effect of using a subset of features for random forrest classification. A number of experiments were performed by training a random forest classifier to establish feature importance; and then training a new random forest with only a subset of the most informative features. More specifically, we train a random forest using subsets of the most informative features in batches of five. As we increase the number of features used we observe a monotonic increase in accuracy; however there are diminishing returns as we can achieve nearly the same accuracy using the 30 most important features, as when using more. Though we could have achieved near same accuracy with an order of magnitude fewer features, we chose to use 150 features because the difference in training time when using less features was negligible. Figure 2 identifies the top-20 ranked features and illustrates their variability across 100 repeated experiments. As seen in figure 1 there is a reduction in gradient when combining the top 15 features compared to using the top 10 features. Figure  2 shows that the top 13 features are comparatively much more important than the rest of the top 20 features, hence there is only a slight increase in accuracy when using the top 15 features compared to using the top 10. After the drop between the rank 13 and rank 14 features, feature importance falls steadily until feature rank 40, after which the reduction in feature importance is less prominent 11 . Note that there is some interchangeability in rank between features, we assign ranks based on the average rank of a feature over the 100 experiments.
Feature set list
Feature importance was computed for each feature over 100 experiments, we order them by the mean feature importance score. From each packet sequence we extract the following features:
• Number of packets statistics. We extract the total number of packets, along with the number of incoming and outgoing packets for the total transmission. These features are used in [34] , [23] , [9] . The number of incoming packets during transmission is the most important feature, and together with the number of outgoing packets during transmission are always two of the five most important features. The total number of packets in transmission has rank 10.
• Incoming & outgoing packets as fraction of total packets. The number of incoming and outgoing packets as a fraction of the total number of packets. A variation of this feature is used in [23] . These are always two of the five most important features.
• Packet ordering statistics. For each successive incoming and outgoing packet we include a feature that indicates the total number of packets seen before it in the sequence.
Variations of these features are used in [34] , [23] and [5] . The standard deviation of the ougoing packet ordering list is the most important of these features with rank 4, the average of the ougoing packet ordering list has rank 7.
The standard deviation of the incoming packet ordering list has rank 12 and the average of the incoming packet ordering list has rank 13.
• Concentration of outgoing packets. We split the packet sequence into non-overlapping chunks of 20 packets. We then count the number of outgoing packets in each of these chunks. We extract along with the entire chunk sequence, the standard deviation, mean, median and max of the sequence of chunks. This provides a snapshot of where outgoing packets are concentrated. A variant of this feature is used in [34] . The features that make up the concentration list are between the 15 th and 30 th most important features, but also make up the bulk of the 75 least important features. The concentration list mean has rank 11, the standard deviation has rank 16, the maximum has rank 30 and the median has rank 65.
• Concentration of incoming & outgoing packets in first & last 30 packets. We count the number of incoming and outgoing packets in the first and last 30 packets. A variation of this feature is used in [34] . The number of incoming and outgoing packets in the first thirty packets has rank 19 and 20, respectively. The number of incoming 11 The total feature importance table is shown in Appendix A.
and outgoing packets in the last thirty packets has rank 50 and 55, respectively.
• Number of packets per second. We count the number of packets per second, along with the mean, standard deviation, min, max, median. The standard deviation feature has rank 38, maximum has rank 42, mean has rank 44, median has rank 50 and minimum has rank 117.
• Alternative concentration features. This subset of features is based on the concentration of outgoing packets feature list. We split the outgoing packets feature list in to 20 evenly sized subsets and sum each subset. This creates a new list of features. Similarly to the concentration feature list, the alternative concentration feature list are regularly in the top 20 most important features and bottom 50 features. Note though concentration features are never seen in the top 15 most important features whereas alternative concentration features are -at rank 14 and 15 -so information is gained by summing the concentration subsets.
• Packet inter-arrival time statistics. For the total, incoming and outgoing packet streams we extract the lists of inter-arrival times between packets. For each list we extract the max, mean, standard deviation, and third quartile. A variation of this feature is used in [2] . These features have rank between 40 and 70.
• Transmission time statistics. For the total, incoming and outgoing packet sequences we extract the first, second, third quartile and total transmission time. This feature is used in [34] . These features have rank between 30 and 50. The total transmission time for incoming and outgoing packet streams are the most important out of this subset of features.
• Alternative number of packets per second features. For the number of packets per second feature list we create 20 even sized subsets and sum each subset. The sum of all subsets is the 9th most important feature. The features produced by each subset are in the bottom 50 features -with rank 101 and below. The important features in this subset are the first few features with rank between 66 and 78, that are calculated from the first few seconds of a packet sequence.
Our analysis concludes that the total number of incoming packets is the most informative feature. This is expected as different web pages have different resource sizes, that are poorly hidden by encryption or anonymization. The number of incoming and outgoing packets as a fraction of the total number of packets are also informative for the same reason. After the inclusion of the 40 most important features, using additional features gives only incremental increases in accuracy.
The least important features are from the padded concentration of outgoing packets list, since the original concentration of outgoing packets lists were of non-uniform size and so have been padded with zeros to give uniform length. Clearly, if most packet sequences have been padded with the same value this will provide a poor criterion for splitting, hence being a feature of low importance. Packet concentration statistics, while making up the bulk of "useless features" also regularly make up a few of the top 30 most important features, they are the first few items that are unlikely to be zero. In other words, the first few values in the packet concentration list do split the data well.
Packet ordering features have rank 4, 7, 12 and 13, indicating these features are a good criterion for splitting. Packet ordering features exploit the information leaked via the way in which browsers request resources and the end server orders the resources to be sent. This supports conclusions in [34] , [5] about the importance of packet ordering features.
We also found that the number of incoming and outgoing packets in the first thirty packets, with rank 19 and 20, were a more important feature than the number of incoming and outgoing packets in the last thirty packets, with rank 50 and 55. In the alternative number packets per second feature list the earlier features were a better criterion for splitting than the later features in the list. This supports claims by Wang et al. [34] that the beginning of a packet sequence leaks more information than the end of a packet sequence. In contrast to Bissias et al. [2] we found packet inter-arrival time statistics, with rank between 40 and 70, only slightly increase the attack accuracy, despite being a key feature in their work.
VI. K-FINGERPRINTING THE WANG ET AL. DATA SET
We first evaluate k-fingerprinting on the Wang et al. data set [34] . This data set was collected over Tor, and thus implements padding of packets to fixed-size cells (512-bytes) and randomization of request orders [25] . Thus the only information available to k-fingerprinting is full cell timing and volume features. As described in section IV there are 100 monitored web pages and 5000 unmonitored web pages in the Wang et al. data set. We train on 60 out of the 90 instances for each monitored page; we vary the number of unmonitored pages on which we train. For the attack evaluation we use fingerprints of length 200 and 150 features. Final classification is as described in section III-C, if all k fingerprints agree on classification a test instance is classified as a monitored web page, otherwise it is classified as an unmonitored web page.
The k-NN classifier [34] is similar to k-fingerprinting. The classifier is trained upon a set of labelled packet sequences D train = {P 1 , ..., P n }, then given a new packet sequence Q 1 the classifier computes the distance with all training points d(Q 1 , P i ) for i ∈ {1, .., n}. Q 1 is then classified as the label of the k closest training instances. Wang et al. use a weighted distance function that learns weights that discriminate against features that do not provide much information. We show that k-fingerprinting performs better than the state-of-the-art k-NN classifier [34] . k-fingerprinting also requires fewer features than the k-NN attack -although most of the features used in k-NN are redundant when attacking Tor. The k-NN attack uses their weighting scheme to generate features that allows packet size features to be ignored. 
A. Attack on Tor
The scenario for the attack is as follows: an attacker, within the threat model described in section III-A, monitors 100 web pages; they wish to know whether a client is visiting one of those pages, and establish which one. The client can browse to any of these web pages or to 5000 unmonitored web pages, which the attacker one classifies in bulk as an unmonitored page.
Using the k-fingerprinting method for classifying a web page we measure a True Positive rate of 0.88 ± 0.01 and a False Positive rate of 0.005 ± 0.001 when training on 3500 unmonitored web pages and k, the number of training instances used for classification, set at k=3. k-fingerprinting achieves better accuracy than the state-of-the-art k-NN attack that has a True Positive rate of 0.85 ± 0.04 and a False Positive rate of 0.006 ± 0.004. Given a monitored web page k-fingerprinting will misclassify this page 12% of the time, while k-NN will misclassify with 15% probability.
Best results are achieved when training on 3500 unmonitored web pages. Table I reports True and False Positive rates when using different numbers of unmonitored web pages for training with k = 3. As we train more unmonitored web pages we decrease our False Positive rate with almost no reduction in True Positive rate. After training 3500 unmonitored pages there is no decrease in False Positives and so no benefit in training more unmonitored web pages. This scheme allows an attacker to decrease False Positives at a cost of decreasing True Positives. This allows an attacker to tune the classifier to either low False Positives or high True Positives depending on the desired application of the attack. Figure 3 illustrates how classification accuracy changes as, k, the number of fingerprints used for classification changes. For a low k the attack achieves a high True Positive rate with high False Positives, as we increase the value of k we reduce the number of misclassifications since it is less likely that all k fingerprints will belong to the same label, but we also reduce the number of True Positives. We find that altering the number of fingerprints used for classification, k, affects the True Positive and False Positive rate more than the number of unmonitored training pages. This suggests that while it is advantageous to have a large world size of unmonitored pages, increasing the number of unmonitored training pages does not increase accuracy of the classifier dramatically. This supports Wang et al.'s [34] claims to the same effect.
Closed-World. In the closed-world scenario in which the client can only browse within the 100 monitored web pages we achieve 0.91 ± 0.01 accuracy. This is comparable to the k-NN accuracy of 0.91 ± 0.03. If we were to use the random forest for final classification in the open-world scenario we would falsely inflate our attack accuracy, since the unmonitored class is much larger than any of the monitored classes. For the closed-world scenario we do not need the additional fingerprint layer for classification, and simply use the classification output of the random forest.
Fingerprint length. Changing the length of the fingerprint vector will affect k-fingerprinting accuracy. For a small fingerprint length there may not be enough diversity to provide an accurate measure of distance over all packet sequences. Figure   4 shows the resulting True Positive rate and False Positive rate as we change the length of fingerprints in the Wang et al. [34] data set. The attack and set up is the same as in section VI-A, we train on 60 out the 90 instances for each monitored web page. We set k=1 and train on 4000 unmonitored web pages. Using only a fingerprint of length one results in a True Positive rate of 0.51 and high False Positive rate of 0.904. Clearly using a fingerprint of length one results in a high False Positive rate since there is a small universe of leaf symbols from which to create the fingerprint. A fingerprint of length 20 results in a True Positive rate of 0.87 and low False Positive rate of 0.013. After this there are diminishing returns for increasing the length of the fingerprint vector.
VII. ATTACK EVALUATION ON DS T or
We now evaluate k-fingerprinting on DS T or . First we evaluate the attack given a monitored set of the top 55 Alexa web pages, with 100 instances for each web page. Then we evaluate the attack given a monitored set of 30 Tor hidden services, with 80 instances for each hidden service. The unmonitored set remains the same for both evaluations, the top 100,000 Alexa web pages with one instance for each web page. Table II shows the accuracy of k-fingerprinting as the number of unmonitored training pages is varied. For the monitored web pages, 70 instances per web page were trained upon and testing was done on the remaining 30 instances of each web page. As expected, the false positive rate decreases as the number of unmonitored training samples grows. Similarly to section VI-A there is only marginal loss in terms of true positives while we see a large reduction in the false positive rate as the number of training samples grows. Meaning an attacker will not have to compromise on true positives to decrease the false positive rate; when scaling the number of unmonitored training samples from 2% to 16% of the entire set the true positive rate decreases from 93% to 91% while the false positive rate decreases from 3.2% to 0.3%. Clearly the attack will improve as the number of training samples grows, but in reality an attacker may have limited resources and training on a significant fraction of 100,000 web pages may be unfeasible. Figure 5 shows the true positive and false positive rate of k-fingerprinting as the number of unmonitored web pages used for testing grows while the number of unmonitored web pages used for training is kept at 2000, for different values of k. We may think of this as the evaluation of success of k-fingerprinting as a client browses to more and more web pages over multiple browsing sessions. Again 70 out of 100 instances were used for training for each monitored web page. Clearly for a small k, both true positives and false positives will be comparitively high. Given that, with k=5 only 2.5% of unmonitored web pages are falsely identified as monitored web pages, out of 100,000 unmonitored web pages. Both the true positive rates and false positive rates remain steady regardless on the number of unmonitored web pages; an attacker can arbitrarily reduce the false positive rate by increasing the number of neighbours used for comparison, albeit at the expense of the true positive rate. Table III shows the accuracy of k-fingerprinting as the number of unmonitored training pages is varied. For the monitored set, 60 instances per hidden service were trained upon and testing was done on the remaining 20 instances of each hidden service. Again we see a marginal loss in terms of true positives while we see a large reduction in the false positive rate as the number of training samples grows. When scaling the number of unmonitored training samples from 2% to 16% of the entire set the true positive rate decreases from 82% to 81% while the false positive rate decreases by an order of magnitude from 0.2% to 0.02%. Meaning when training on 16% of the unmonitored set only 16 unmonitored web pages out of 84,000 were misclassified as a Tor hidden service. In comparison to the Alexa web pages monitored set the true positives is around 10% lower, while the false positive rate is also vastly reduced. This is clear evidence that Tor hidden services are easy to distinguish from standard web pages loaded over Tor. Similarly to figure 5, figure 6 shows the true positive and false positive rate of k-fingerprinting as the number of unmonitored web pages used for testing grows while the number of unmonitored web pages used for training is kept at 2000, for different values of k. Monitored training was done on 60 out of the 80 instances, with the remaining 20 left for testing. Both the true positive rate and false positive rate is lower than in figure 5. For example, given 100,000 unmonitored pages, using k=5, the false positive rate is 0.2% which equates to only 200 unmonitored pages being falsely classified as monitored pages.
A. Alexa web pages monitored set

B. Hidden services monitored set
It is clear that an attacker need only train on a small fraction of data to launch a powerful fingerprinting attack. It is also clear that Tor hidden services are easily distinguished from standard web pages, rendering them vulnerable to website fingerprinting attacks. We attribute the lower false positive rate of Tor hidden services when compared to a monitored training set of standard web page traffic to this distinguishability. A standard web page is more likely to be confused with another standard web page than a Tor hidden service.
VIII. ATTACK EVALUATION ON DS N orm
Besides testing on DS T or and the Wang et al. [34] data set we tested the efficacy of k-fingerprinting on DS N orm . This allows us to establish how accurate k-fingerprinting is over a standard web browsing session.
A. Attack on encrypted browsing sessions
An encrypted browsing session does not pad packets to a fixed size and the attacker may extract the following features in addition to time features:
• Size transmitted. For each packet sequence we extract the total size of packets transmitted, in addition, we extract the total size of incoming packets and the total size of outgoing packets.
• Size transmitted statistics. For each packet sequence we extract the average, variance, standard deviation and maximum packet size of the total sequence, the incoming sequence and the outgoing sequence. We evaluate the efficacy of k-fingerprinting when a client is browsing the internet without Tor but with encryption. The attacker will have access to packet size information as well as packet timings from which they can infer information about the web page the client is browsing. Apart from this modification in available features, the attack scenario is similar: An attacker monitors a client browsing online and attempts to infer which web pages they are visiting. The only difference is that browsing with the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, or Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, versions 2.0 and 3.0, exposes the destination IP address and port. The attack is now trying to infer which web page the client is visiting from the known website 12 . For this attack the attacker monitors 55 web pages, they wish to know if the client has visited one of these pages. The client can browse to any of these web pages or to 7000 other web pages, which the attacker does not care to classify other than as unmonitored pages. We train on 20 out of the 30 instances for each monitored page and vary the number of unmonitored pages we train.
Despite more packet sequence information to exploit, the larger cardinality of world size gives rise to more opportunities for incorrect classifications. The attack achieves a True Positive rate of 0.87 ± 0.02 and a False Positive rate of 0.004 ± 0.001. We achieved best results when training on 4000 unmonitored web pages. Table IV report on results for training on different number of unmonitored web pages, 12 Note that the data sets are composed of traffic instances from some websites without SSL and TLS, as well as websites using the protocols. with k = 2. Figure 7 shows our results when modifying the number of fingerprints used (k) and training on 2000 unmonitored pages. We find that altering the number of unmonitored training pages decreases the False Positive rate while only slightly decreasing the True Positive rate. This mirrors our experimental findings from the Wang et al. data set.
Closed-World. In the closed-world scenario in which the client can only browse within the 55 monitored web pages we achieve 0.96 ± 0.02 accuracy. In this setting we do not need the additional fingerprint layer for classification, we can simply use the classification output of the random forest.
Number of monitored training pages in closed-world. Figure 8 shows the out-of-bag score 13 as we change the number of monitored pages we train. We found that training on any more than a third of the data gives roughly the same accuracy. 13 Defined in section III-B.
B. Attack without packet size features
DS N orm was not collected via Tor and so also contains packet size information. We remove this to allow for comparison with DS T or and the Wang et al. data set which was collected over Tor. This also gives us a baseline for how much more powerful k-fingerprinting is when we have additional packet size features available. We achieved a True Positive rate of 0.81 ± 0.01 and False Positive rate of 0.005 ± 0.002 when training on 5000 unmonitored web pages. Table V shows our results at other sizes of training samples, with k = 2. Removing packet size features reduces the True Positive rate by over 0.05 percentile points and increases the False Positive rate by 0.001 percentile points. Clearly packet size features improve our classifier in terms of correct identifications but do not decrease the number of unmonitored test instances that were incorrectly classified as a monitored page.
Closed-World. In the closed-world scenario in which the client can only browse within the 55 monitored web pages k-fingerprinting is 0.91 ± 0.02 accurate. Showing that in the closed-world scenario attack accuracy improves by 5% when we include packet size features.
C. Attack on larger world size
We run k-fingerprinting with the same number of monitored sites but increase the numbered of unmonitored sites to 17,000. We evaluate when we have both time and size features available. Figure 9 shows the results of k-fingerprinting while varying the number of fingerprints (k) used for classification, from between 1 and 10, for various experiments trained with different numbers of unmonitored pages. We see that the attack results are comparable to the attack on 7000 unmonitored pages, meaning there is no degradation in attack accuracy when we increase the world size by 10,000 web pages. Training on approximately 30% of the 7000 unmonitored web pages kfingerprinting gives a True Positive rate of over 0.90 and a False Positive rate of 0.01 for k=1. Training on approximately 30% of the 17,000 unmonitored web pages k-fingerprinting gives a True Positive rate of 0.90 and a False Positive rate of 0.006 for k=1. The fraction of unmonitored pages that were incorrectly classified as a monitored page decreased as we increased our world size. In other words, out of 12,000 unmonitored pages only 72 were classified as a monitored page, with this figure dropping to 24 if we use k=10 for classification. This provides a strong indication that k-fingerprinting can scale to a realworld attack in which a client is free to browse the entire internet, with no decrease in attack accuracy.
IX. FINE GRAINED FALSE POSITIVES
1) Closed World: We observe that the classification error is not uniform across all web pages 14 . Some pages are misclassified many times, and confused with many others, while others are never misclassified. An attacker can leverage this information to estimate the misclassification rate of each web page instead of using the global average misclassification rate.
An attacker can use their training set of web pages to estimate the misclassification rate of each web page, by splitting the training set in to a smaller training set and validation set. Since both sets are from the original training set the attacker has access to the true labels. The attacker then computes the misclassification rate of each web page, which they can use as an estimation for the misclassification rate when training on the entire training set and testing on new traffic instances. Figures 10 and 11 show the global misclassification rate for a varying number of monitored pages. Monitored pages are first ordered in terms of the misclassification rate they have, ordered from smallest to largest. From figure 10, using the Wang et al. data set, we see that if the attacker considers only the top 50% on web pages in terms of per page misclassification rate, the true global misclassification rate and global misclassification rate estimated by the attacker drop by over 70%. Similarly from figure 11, using DS N orm , if the attacker 14 See additional evidence in Appendix B. considers only the top 50% on web pages in terms of per page misclassification rate, the true global misclassification rate and global misclassification rate estimated by the attacker drop by over 80%. This allows an attacker to train on monitored pages and then cull the pages that have too high an error rate, allowing for more confidence in the classification of the rest of the monitored pages.
The gap between the attacker's estimate and the misclassification rate of the test set is largely due to the size of the data set. Figure 10 has a smaller error of estimate than figure 11 because the Wang et al. data set has 60 instances per monitored page, in comparison DS N orm has 20 instances per monitored page. In practice, an attacker cannot expect perfect alignment; they are generated from two different sets of data, the training and training + test set. Nevertheless the attacker can expect this difference to decrease with the collection of more training instances.
2) Open World on Alexa monitored set of DS T or : In addition to computing the misclassification rates in a closedworld scenario, an attacker can compute the true positive rate and false positive rates for monitored and unmonitored pages. A naive approach to this problem would be to first find which fingerprints contribute to the many misclassifications and remove them. Our analysis shows that the naive approach of removing "bad" fingerprints that contribute to many misclassifications is floored 15 . We again observed that the classification error is not uniform across all web pages. Similar to the closed-world scenario, an attacker can use their training set of web pages to estimate the true positive and false positives rates of each web page, by splitting the training set in to a smaller training set and validation set. Since both sets are from the original training set the attacker has access to the true labels. The attacker then computes the true positive and false positive rates of each web page, which they can use as an estimation for the rates when training on the entire training set and testing on new traffic instances. More specifically we split, for the monitored training set of 70 instance for each of the Alexa top 55 web pages, into smaller training sets of 40 instances and validation sets of 30 instances. This is used as a misclassification estimator for the full training set of 70 instances against the true test set of 30 instances, that is an estimator of how often each monitored web page will be misclassified. Similarly we split the unmonitored training in half, one set as a smaller training set and the other as a validation set. Figures 12, 13, 14, 15 show the true positive and false positive rate under this scenario for a varying number of unmonitored pages. Monitored pages are first ordered in terms of the misclassification rate they have, ordered from best to worst in terms of their true positive rate. As the size of the unmonitored training set increases so too does the accuracy both the attackers estimate of the false positive rate, and the correct false positive rate. Nevertheless even with a small unmonitored training set of 2000 web pages, which is then split in to a training set of 1000 web pages and a validation set of 1000 web pages, an attacker can accurately estimate the false positive rate of the attack if some of the monitored web pages were removed. For example, using only the best 20 monitored web pages (in terms of true positive rate), an attacker would estimate that using those 20 web pages as a monitored set, the false positive rate would 0.012. Using the entire data set we see that the real false positive rate of these 20 web pages is 0.010; the attacker has nearly precisely estimated the utility of removing a large fraction of the original monitored set. There is a small difference between estimated and the actual false positive rate in all of figures 12, 13, 14 and 15. Furthermore there is little benefit in training more unmonitored data if the attacker wants to accurately estimate 15 See additional evidence in Appendix C. the false positive rate; figure 12 has a similar gap between the estimate false positive rate and real false positive rate when compared to figure 15 .
From 12, 13, 14, 15 it is evident even with small original training set, an attacker can identify web pages that are likely to be misclassified and then accurately calculate the utility of removing these web pages from their monitored set.
X. ATTACK ON HARDENED DEFENSES
For direct comparison we tested our random forest classifier in a closed-world scenario on various defenses against the k-NN attack using the Wang et al. data set [34] . Note that most of these defenses require large bandwidth overheads that may render them unusable for the average client. We test against the following defenses: Rates for training on 8000 unmonitored pages, testing on 8000, and comparison when training on the full 16000 unmonitored pages and testing on the remaining 84000 unmonitored pages in DS T or , k=3.
• BuFLO [9] . This defense sends packets at a constant size during fixed time intervals. This potentially extends the length of transmission and requires dummy packets to fill in gaps.
• Decoy pages [23] . This defense loads a decoy page whenever another page is loaded. This provides background noise that degrades the accuracy of an attack.
• Traffic morphing [36] . Traffic morphing morphs a clients traffic to look like another set of web pages. A client chooses the source web pages that they would like to defend, as well as a set of target web pages that they would like to make the source processes look like.
• Tamaraw [31] . Tamaraw operates similarly to BuFLO but fixes packet sizes depending on their direction. Outgoing traffic is fixed at a higher packet interval, this reduces overhead as outgoing traffic is less frequent. Table VI shows the performance of k-fingerprinting against k-NN under various website fingerprinting defenses in a closedworld setting on 100 different web pages -meaning an attacker monitors these web pages and a client can only browse to these web pages. Under every defense k-fingerprinting is comparable or achieves better results than the k-NN attack. Note that k-fingerprinting does equally well when traffic morphing is applied compared to no defense. As Lu et al. [18] note, traffic morphing is only effective when the attacker restricts attention to the same features targeted by the morphing process. Our results confirm that attacks can succeed even when traffic morphing is employed. 0.90 ± 0.03 0.82 ± 0.06 50 ± 10 Tamaraw [31] 0.10 ± 0.01 0.09 ± 0.02 96 ± 9 Decoy pages [23] 0.37 ± 0.01 0.30 ± 0.06 130 ± 20 BuFLO [9] 0.21 ± 0.02 0.10 ± 0.03 190 ± 20
XI. ATTACK SUMMARY
Past and current works on website fingerprinting either use the artificial closed-world model or an open-world model that is limited in size. The current largest studies using an openworld scenario by Wang et al. [34] , and Panchenko et al. [23] , both consider 5000 unmonitored sites. Our study considers 55 monitored web pages and unmonitored world sizes of 7,000, 17,000 and 100,000 web pages. By reducing the number of monitored web pages and number of examples we train upon, and increasing the number of unmonitored web pages we greatly increase the chance of False Positives -since we have more unmonitored sites that could be classified as a monitored site. This reflects realistic conditions where an attacker would like to monitor a small number of web pages out of a large universe of web pages they do not care about.
Best attack results on data sets were achieved when we train on approximately two thirds of the unmonitored web pages. Despite this results from DS T or show that an attacker can achieve a very small false positive rate while only training on 2% of the unmonitored data. Training on 2% of 100,000 unmonitored web pages greatly reduces the attack set up costs while only marginally reducing the accuracy, providing a realistic scenario under which an attack could be launched. Figure 8 illustrates that compared to training on a small number of monitored instances increasing the size of the monitored training set only incrementally increases accuracy. Results on all data sets also suggest that altering k, the number of fingerprints used for classification, has a greater influence on accuracy than the number of training samples. By varying the number of k training instances considered when classifying a test instance, an attacker may trade the True Positive rate for the False Positive rate. Figure 1 illustrates that the attack achieves approximately the same accuracy using the best 30 features, as when using more of them. Using packet size features in addition to timing features increases the True Positive rate by 5% but does not dramatically decrease the False Positive rate. Similarly from figure 4 we see that k-fingerprinting has nearly the same True Positive and False Positive rates using fingerprints of length 20 as it does for fingerprints of length 200.
In terms of type of web page, k-fingerprinting achieves the same accuracy regardless of the target monitored set. The monitored set in the Wang et al. data set consists of some websites not found in Alexa 10,000 list [1] , and the DS T or/N orm monitored sets were taken from the top 100 Alexa websites. Although we do see a reduction in the false positive rate when the target monitored set are Tor hidden services due to the distinguishibility between the hidden services and the unmonitored web pages.
We also highlight the non-uniformity of classification performance: when a monitored web page is misclassified, it is usually misclassified on multiple tests. We show that an attacker can use their training set to estimate the error rate of k-fingerprinting per web page, and select targets with low misclassification rates.
k-fingerprinting is more accurate and uses fewer features than state-of-the-art attacks. Furthermore k-fingerprinting is faster than current state-of-the-art website fingerprinting attacks. On the Wang et al. data set training time for 6,000 monitored and 2,500 unmonitored training pages is 30.738 CPU seconds on an 1.4 GHz Intel Core i5z. The k-NN attack [34] has training time per round of 0.064 CPU seconds for 2500 unmonitored training pages. For 6,000 rounds training time is 384.0 CPU seconds on an AMD Opteron 2.2 GHz cores. This can be compared to around 500 CPU hours using the attack described by Cai et al. [5] . Testing time per instance for k-fingerprinting is around 0.1 CPU seconds, compared to 0.1 CPU seconds to classify one instance for k-NN and 450 CPU seconds for the attack described by Cai et al. [5] .
XII. DISCUSSION OF PRACTICALITIES
Website fingerprinting research has been criticised for not being applicable to real-world scenarios [14] , [24] . We have shown that a website fingerprinting attack can scale to the number of traffic instance an attacker may sample over long period of time with hardly any false positives. We have also shown how a realistic attack may wish to throw away some training information which could confuse the classifier. However, here we present limitations of our and other website fingerprint attacks:
Multitab browsing. Website fingerprinting attacks have so far only considered a client that browses the internet using a single tab. The ability to separate traffic into relevant packet streams when a client browses online has so far not been researched -and our work shines no light on this topic. As Juarez et al. note that real-world browsing session tend to be performed with multiple tabs [20] , [29] .
Short-lived websites. Website content rapidly changes which will negatively affect the accuracy of a website fingerprinting attack [14] . As the content of a website changes so will the generated packet sequences, if an attacker cannot train on this new data then an attack will suffer. However we note that an attack will suffer from the ephemeral nature of websites at different rates depending on the type of website being monitored. For example, an attack monitoring a news or social media site can expect a faster degradation in performance compared to an attack monitoring a landing page of a top 10 Alexa site [1] . Also note Tor does not cache by default, so if in the realistic scenario where an attacker wanted to monitor www.facebook.com a client would be forced to navigate to the facebook landing page, which hosts content that is long lived. Network conditions and noise. In reality an attacker will not be able to perfectly replicate the network conditions of a client's browsing session. This means the training set the attacker collected before the attack will not be a perfect representation of the traffic they wish to monitor. It is also highly unlikely a client will browse the internet with no other background traffic present. Both of these things will limit the practicality of a real-world website fingerprinting attack. Feature importance. One limitation of our feature importance analysis is that our implementation of random forests uses axis-aligned splits and so cannot capture the non-linear relationships that features have with one another. Packet features may have dependency relationships between one another that cannot be captured by the attack.
XIII. CONCLUSION
Website fingerprinting attacks are a serious threat to a client's online privacy. Clients of both Tor and standard web browsers are at risk from website fingerprinting attacks regardless of whether they browse to hidden services or standard websites. k-fingerprinting improves on state-of-the-art attacks in terms of both speed and accuracy. We have shown that current website fingerprinting defenses either do not defend against k-fingerprinting or incur such a high bandwidth cost that it renders the defense unfeasible. Using random forests to extract robust fingerprints of web pages we can perform an attack that increases True Positives and decreases False Positives when compared to state-of-the-art website fingerprinting attacks. Additionally we showed that misclassification rates of web pages is highly non-uniform; patterns of misclassification can be exploited to perform a more accurate attack.
We also conducted feature analysis of features used in the attack, these features are often used in other website fingerprinting works. We found that simple features such as counting the number of incoming and outgoing packets were more important than complex features such as packet interarrival times or packet ordering features.
Our world size is the biggest used in any website fingerprinting study so far. k-fingerprinting achieves good results even when an attacker trains on a small fraction of the total data. Untrustworthy data within that small fraction can then be filtered and removed before the attack is launched to later yield better results, showing that long term website fingerprinting attacks on a targeted client is a realistic possibility. 
APPENDIX B CONFUSION MATRIX FOR CLOSED-WORLD SIMULATED
ATTACK ON TOR. Figure 17 shows the confusion matrix in our closed-world scenario, that is, it shows the 49 misclassifications (out of 550). We see that some persistent misclassification patterns of web pages appear, for example web page 54 is classified correctly four times but is misclassified as web page 0 six times. The misclassification rate in figure 17 is 0.09 but this is the average error rate across all web pages. Figure 18 shows the 50 fingerprints that cause the most misclassifications, and also shows for those same fingerprints the number of correct classifications they make. As we can see nearly all "bad" fingerprints actually contribute to many correct classifications. Number of classifications contributed to misclassification correct classification Fig. 18 . The fingerprints that lead to the most misclassifications and the "good" classifications they contribute to. Training on 2000 unmonitored pages and testing on 10000 unmonitored pages with k=3.
APPENDIX C GOOD VS. BAD FINGERPRINTS
